This is neither persuasive nor ingenious analysis of the chaotic and primitive Somali politics which follows no known political pattern or principle. The power brokers and the players of the pernicious Somali politics have always been the same: warlords, clannish opportunists, embezzlers and remnants of previous failed regimes. Another unpredicted group, the Islamists, joined the ranks of those usual suspects.
Because of the powerful newcomers by the name of the Union of Islamic courts; and because of their sudden pre-eminence in Somali polity and because of the obstinate nature of Somalis in general to compromise and reconcile, it is reasonable to ponder some of the basis why the two parties to present-day Somali conundrum are not coming face to face to reach a deal and to save Somalia from further destruction and mayhem.
They say “It takes two to tango.” but what happens when one is quiescent or not willing to reach a deal at all without either getting the green light from foreign masters in other lands or one is intoxicated with sudden clout and muscle?
No one is exactly sure when the much delayed, Arab sponsored, second round talks in Khartoum between the Islamic courts and the ineffectual TFG will take place? Both, one time or the other, said they will go to Khartoum without any preconditions. But few heretical backpedaling come out in the open. By just paying careful attention to how things are progressing in both camps, one will concede that the blurred meeting may never take place.
The courts’ expansion and consolidation of power into central regions became a pretext for the weak TFG in Baidao to circumvent going to
Khartoum. To avoid the second round talks, the TFG warlord-cum-president, Yusuf started his emblematic denunciation and reproachful rhetoric against the courts and refused to ever negotiate with “Islamic terrorists”. This line of premeditated fault-finding of opponents didn’t work for him though. The overrated terrorist card, overplayed time and time again didn’t resonate in international circles. Then, Yusuf started to mull over dealing the clannish cards and maybe offer the PM position to the other famed sheriff of the courts. Brokers in the provincial seat of the TFG in Baidao, in their plotting wisdom, sought the easy way through apathetic appeasement. Why? The insinuations from international circles for TFG to share power with the moderate elements in the courts were seen as an alternative.
The Islamic forces came close and were in the neighborhood. Buurhakaba, the other major Bay City is sympathetic to the courts. One of its sons is a major player in the Islamic leadership and is one of those powerful lieutenants leading the uprising that is taking place in Southern Somalia.
Ghedi, the goofy prime minister, got abandoned by members of his inflated cabinet and had clashes with warlord-cum- president, and the speaker of the parliament.Ghedi, for a moment became the sacrificial lamb. Ghedi fought back and for the first time in his premiership and tried to put forth his weight and go up against Yusuf’s calculated political choreography. Beside, this presidential backstabbing within the TFG was the Parliament Speaker’s pre-emptive posturing to send delegation of parliamentarians to Khartoum to negotiate with the court officials.
And all of these in-fighting in Baidoa frightened the hell-out of TFG benefactors. All the way from Addis Ababa, came Mesfin, the Ethiopian foreign minister, to pan out the TFG bickering and power struggle and to give it another bogus blood. Somalis see Mesfin’s immediate dictates to the Yusuf –Sherriff – Ghedi trio to get along as a disgrace to Somali dignity. By Mesfin suggestion, Ghedi formed a slimmed down cabinet including two-thirds of his opportunistic deserters and many known gun-totters like Warlords Shaati-Gaduud and Hiiraale. A friend of mine nauseatingly reacted to the formation of Ghedi’s cabinet.
“Every time, I see the names of these murderers, I feel like someone put hot sauce in my eyes, my whole body aches and flinches at hearing the names of these awful men. I feel pain deep down inside.” He further dared me to read the list of Ghedi’s cabinet ministers to point out that his uncle is part of the nominated, representing the clan through the 4.5 doctrine which is meant to destroy the Somali nation. The Tigre minority dictatorship is not only the TFG backer but it is the one that still supports the Mogadishu ousted warlords who terrorized the people in Capital for 15 years. My friend also mentioned that some of the ousted warlords are now finding refuge and protection in Baidao. Forget the fact the warlords were the ones who passionately opposed the weak TFG for all its unproductive two year term. The Tigre gang meddling in Somali affairs proves TFG reliance of Ethiopia and makes the whole TFG sham as illegitimate entity which only serves the interest of the archetypical Somali enemy. Ethiopia wants to keep Somalia weak and divided into clannish fiefdoms. The recent blessing of Ethiopia of yet another expediently formed state by the name of Galmudug and its arming of one the defeated Mogadishu warlord, namely Abdi Qaybdiid who is preposterously crowned as the defense minister of this new clannish fiefdom is an indication of Ethiopia ultimate will to keep Somalia unstable forever. Galmudug was haphazardly established as buffer zone to counter the expansion of the courts into Puntland.
The Ethiopian incursions into Somali territory forced the courts to justify their refusal of going to Khartoum. And now the courts are calling a Somali owned peace conference in Somali soil. Enough with the foreign meddling is their motto and that is ringing music into the majority of Somali ears. The courts logic is very appealing. A warlord government shaped in Kenya through Ethiopian backing can’t be seriously seen as legitimate Somali government. Aren’t the 15 or so failed foreign sponsored peace attempts a lesson?
In short time the courts won the hearts and minds of many Somalis. Warlords are ousted.Mogadishu is pacified. Since the Islamic takeover of the capital, not a single gunfire is shot or heard any more. No more roadblocks or checkpoints. The marauding drug-crazed militias of the ruthless warlords are nowhere to be found. Mogadishu residents are now comfortably venturing to neighborhoods that were off-limits in the past. Moreover,Mogadishu’s main seaports and international airport are being put back together. Charcoal and wildlife trade is banned. To the surprise of many, the courts are not only proving to be environmentally conscious but socially and communally just. The courts rejected and called un-Islamic the foul 4.5 clan power sharing formula. No more are there any minor clans in Somalia. All are equal. Clannish association is no longer significant when there is a concerted plan to undermine Islam, the very underlying principle for the courts. Some cynics have been complaining about the clannish nature of the Islamic courts. However, most well meaning Somalis choose to pay no heed to such canard and instead choose to morally support the Islamic enterprise. However, these well meaning Somalis are weary about what the future holds for Somalia with all the looming foreign interventions. The Islamic courts and their conviction that Somali society should be governed in accordance with Islamic precepts and law have received a great public and global attention. The Somali religious leaders have been prominent in Somali society for centuries but their clout dwindled with raise of clannish opportunists and warlords. But there are some who believe the new Islamists are not the archetypal broadminded religious leaders, Somalis were familiar with. Some of the actions of the courts, shutting down movie theatres, ordering videotapes and forcing teenagers to shave their hair are some of the examples of their prejudice to modernity. The banning of civil engagements such as the Al-Islah assembly is seen as a more problematic backlash than other trivial incidents.
One would ask why both the TFG and the ICU are refusing to attend the Khartoum talks. The prevailing premise is the fear that sides could be outdistanced by the other in the negotiations. For TFG, it only rules one city other than proclaiming on its international legitimacy. In its Hobbesian tactics, the TFG wants to buy out time and prolong its international legitimacy thus engaging in risk-averse strategies to forge a way to divide and weaken the assumed loose coalition of the courts. Despite their triumphs, the courts feel they are being treated unequally by the West. They have already been labeled as a threat to the stability of the whole region. The courts want to isolate the TFG in the small city they reside now and make it irrelevant in the eyes of the public.
The lingering face-off between the courts and the TFG also worries Somalis with goodwill. The longer this standoff remains, the weaker the Islamic courts mission may become, the probable that some schism within the courts may come to fore. And this could throw Mogadishu back to its violent past. And the courts break-up could also embolden the weak TFG and its Ethiopian benefactors to aggressively proceed with their disruptive carving of Somalia into warlord enclaves. Ethiopia is the problem and the international community should curb the Tigre dictatorship not to send troops to Somalia. The predicament in Somalia will get worse if Meles Zenawi and his hegemonic projects are not put to a full stop.
Because of political maturity, parties to conflict develop an environment of trust and friendly relations to finally cooperate. However, those of embryonic political persuasions such as the clannish parties in Somalia, with their history of violent disputes, mistrust and animosity could only develop platforms for perpetual conflict. The absence of trust within Somali polity is the structural problem which leads to the absence of any solutions. The traditional power-politics of Somalia results from pastoral nomadic clans competing for meager resources and those who gain power in the name of central government or authority, presumptions go, could have an access to such paltry wherewithal. The competing Somali parties with their perceived governmental authority or religious principles have the potential to do as much harm as good. Probably both parties to our present-day problem may continue to their self destructive course of confrontation and probably with the help of foreign meddling things may get worse. But there are always those optimistic Somalis who refuse that Somali clans are always conflict-ridden. Such hope is enforced by the many civil society and women organizations that are now trying to meditate these conflicting TFG and ICU together. Conflicts and collaborations are both common feature of Somali clan culture. Partnership for peace requires a blend of common and communal interest in which a consensus could be reached. Such factors as reciprocity and bargaining will help Somali groups to recognize what they have in common and maybe overcome the clan mistrust that separates them. The best anyone could hope is for Somali power brokers to re-evaluate their positions and to forge way out of this stalemate.
Shaacir Mataan
